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Introduction
Recent activities by the governments of influential nation-states,
on the international level as well as within internal policy-making
processes, provide convincing evidence of a growing concern over the
legal and political problems arising from intensified use of the ocean for
many purposes.' Decisions made by public international organi-
zations, partly in response to initiatives by individual member states,
are additional indications of the relatively sudden emergence of the
ocean as a major focus of national and international political
consideration.2 Private agencies, too, primarily national in orientation,
are now organizing for examination of the problems expected to
emerge as various groups seek to realize greater benefits from the
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
t This paper is an extract from a longer study which was commissioned by the
International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research, Stockholm, Sweden. It is reprinted
here, with slight revision, with the permission of the Institute. The full study also includes
discussion of issues pertaining to mineral resources, military use of the seabed and scientific
research. This study, along with comments and contributions by other participants in an
Institute symposium which met in Stockholm in June 1968, is available from the Institute
under the title: Toward a Better Use of the Ocean: A Study and Prognosis.
I Both the United States and the Soviet Union have taken the initiative on the
international level to ask for investigation or, even, resolution of certain problems. United
States government officials claim major responsibility for General Assembly Resolution 2172
(Resources of the Sea) adopted in December, 1966. The First Report of the President to the
Congress on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, Marine Science Affairs-A Year
of Transition 35 (1967); Bellman, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Address
before American Bar Association National Institute on Marine Resources, p. 2, June 8, 1967.
As is well known, the Soviet Union took the lead in pressing for the study of legal
problems of scientific research and ocean resources within the Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission of UNESCO.
2 Reference is made to the Economic and Social Council resolution 1112 (XL), March
7, 1966; General Assembly Resolution 2172 (XXI), December 8, 1966; General Assembly
Resolution 2340 (XXII); and, Resolution V-6 adopted at the Fifth Session, Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission, Oct. 19-28, 1967, entitled "The Establishment of an IOC Working
Group on Legal Questions Related to Scientific Investigations of the Ocean."
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oceanic part of the planet.' Although there are some indications of
concern by international private organizations, the extent of this has
been slight to the present time.4
The problems to be confronted by states in attempting to
maintain a viable public order for the oceans, to the extent that such
problems can now be identified with useful certainty, are compounded
both of novel legal conflicts and of recurring controversies that have
acquired new connotations or urgency. The occasion for the emergence
of this mixture of problems consists of several elements, including the
rapid progress now being made in scientific and technological develop-
ments affecting man's relation to the oceanic environment, the
perception that the enlarged capacities in ocean use made possible by
science and technology permit mankind to turn to the ocean to relieve
certain social and economic problems created by a rapidly increasing
population, and the awareness that the nature of the ocean environ-
ment requires international consideration and disposition of contro-
versies over its use.'
Access to ocean fisheries is a source of conflict that may be traced
back for centuries, yet recent developments pose the problem in new
forms or in intensified versions of old difficulties. Although on some
occasions disputes over fisheries cause serious political difficulties
between states, the impact is generally rather minor and, hence, the
reason for considering this problem area stems not from its potential
for consequential disruption in relations between states, but from its
potential for alleviating the world-wide problem of protein deficiency.
The objective is to promote the use of marine food sources and to avoid
3 Without attempting exhaustive enumeration, the following groups and activities may
be listed within the United States: The American Bar Association has three committees at work
in the Section on Natural Resources and the Section on International and Comparative Law;
the Law of the Sea Institute has held annual week-long meetings since 1966 at the University of
Rhode Island; the Mershon Center for Education in National Security of The Ohio State
University and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace jointly sponsored two
conferences in 1967 on Law, Organization and Security in the Use of the Ocean; the American
Assembly of Columbia University sponsored an Assembly on The Uses of the Sea in May, 1968;
the American Branch of the International Law Association has recently established a
Committee on Deep Sea Mineral Resources.
4 The principal activity is that of newly formed Deep Sea Mining Committee of the
International Law Association.
5 The text statement is not intended to affirm that the ocean is the source of
enormous riches merely waiting to be plucked, as one picks fruit from a tree. However it is to
be expected that marine resources and the environment can be used in ways that, with
ingenuity and effort, will provide measurable assistance of various kinds to what may be hoped
is a widening circle of beneficiaries.
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unreasonable interference with the most effective employment of such
sources. The yield from the ocean has been increasing faster than
population for the past several years and there is reason to believe that
under certain conditions it can be increased several times more over the
next decade or so. Access to the sea for realizing such increases in ways
consistent with sustainable production, and division of the yield or the
benefits of it on the most equitable possible basis, call for continued
scrutiny and research on an international basis.
Claims and Counterclaims
The trend toward expansion of claims by states to exclusive use
and control over adjacent fishing areas has continued unabated, or more
accurately in accelerated fashion, since the Geneva conferences of 1958
and 1960 on the law of the sea. The techniques employed for seeking
expansion are primarily three: (1) changes in the means for determining
the area of internal waters; (2) extension of the territorial sea; and (3)
creation of a special contiguous zone within which the same rights
apply as are exercised by the state within the territorial sea. An
additional, if only locally important, method is that of asserting that
certain animal resources are "natural resources" of the continental shelf
which, by treaty, are within the control of the adjacent coastal state.
It would advance the discussion relatively little to offer detail
regarding claims by states to establish straight baseline systems for
fixing the limit of internal waters. Suffice to say that since the 195 1
decision in the Fisheries case, ICJ Reports, 116 (Dec. 18, 1951), a
considerable number of states have adopted such a means of delimi-
tation.6 Because of the differing nature of individual claims, the
opposing claims alleging unlawfulness must necessarily vary.
There is no doubt whatsoever that state claims to a particular
width for their territorial sea have had a notable tendency to expand
over the past 10 to 15 years. Dramatic indication may be seen in
comparison of claims made in 1951 with those now. In 1951 a
comprehensive study by Dr. S. Whittemore Boggs reported only three
states claiming 12 miles: the U.S.S.R., Colombia and Guatemala.7 As of
April 1, 1967, this number had increased to thirty-one, and Colombia
6 The United Kingdom, Canada, Iceland, Yugoslavia, China (Mainland), Indonesia, the
Philippines are among states claiming the system.
7 Boggs, National Claims in Adjacent Seas, 41 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 185,
192-98 (1951).
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had reduced its claim to 6 miles.' In 195 1 the great preponderance of
states were recorded as claiming a territorial sea of three miles, with at
least 45 to be noted, not counting colonial possessions. Today the
number of 12-mile states exceeds those opting for 3 miles since the
latter number has shrunk to 30. Of the 91 states on which data is
available, two-thirds (61) claim more than 3 miles. However, it certainly
merits emphasis that of this 61 only 7 make claim to more than 12
miles and that each of these greatly exceeds 12.' The major, if not sole,
thrust of counterclaim occurs in opposition to these few assertions of
authority that greatly exceed a twelve-mile limit.
Drawing similar comparisons in relation to special contiguous
zones for fisheries is complicated by the lack of reliable data for earlier
claims, but it is reasonably clear that such zones were very few in
number until recent years. A close scrutiny of Dr. Boggs' 195 1 survey
discloses only about a half dozen such claims.' 0 That a very substantial
shift has occurred in this respect is evident from that fact that at least
35 states now have provisions for exclusive fishing in contiguous zones
of various widths. More significant than numbers, however, are the
identity of the states concerned since virtually all western European
states,' ' Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand now
extend their authority over fisheries to regions beyond the territorial
sea. With very few exceptions the zones are limited to a width of twelve
miles. With the exception of the exaggerated claims to zones of 200
miles, sometimes cast in terms of "sovereignty" over natural resources,
claims in opposition to exclusive fishing zones are negligible.
Beyond these claims to exclusive disposition of fishery resources,
which mostly relate to areas in relatively close proximity to coasts, the
overriding claim to fisheries is inclusive in nature. Each state asserts that
its nationals are entitled to have free access to the resources beyond
The text statements are based on the table in H. R. Rep. No. 999, at 161-63, except
that the 12-mile group here is considered to include North Korea and North Vietnam.
9 These seven states are: Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama and Peru (all 200
miles); Guinea (130 miles); and Chile (50 kilometers). It should be added, however, that the
archipelago states of Indonesia and the Philippines claim extensive areas within their territorial
seas and that the width of the latter is virtually irrelevant to the extent of water area within the
limit. This is because of the fact that these states are composed of numerous, far-flung islands.
10 These claims include France, Iceland, Lebanon, Syria, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
and Ecuador. The list could be expanded a little if claims to sedentary species were included
along with those claims put forward in terms of the sea above the continental shelf.
I For an account of European events see Johnson, European Fishery Limits in
Developments in the Law of the Sea 1958-1964, 48 (1965) (Special Publ. No. 6 of the British
Institute of International and Comparative Law).
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exclusive control without limitation other than that accepted in
international agreement. Such counterclaims as exist are devoted to
attempts to modify this regime in order to establish some degree of
shared authority, through explicit agreement, by which regulations may
be prescribed for maintaining the yield of a particular stock or stocks in
a region.
Clarification of Policy
The fundamental policy problem is that of securing an allocation
of competence among states which promotes the utilization of ocean
fisheries as a direct or indirect source of food, provides for maintenance
of supplies (yield) through time, and encourages a rational allocation of
effort to fishery exploitation. Three principal means of achieving such
an allocation are commonly recommended: expansion of exclusive
fishing limits to various, sometimes extremely lengthy, distances from
coasts; creation of a single, all-embracing, public international
organization to undertake the management and control of all fishery
operations outside exclusive areas; and, emphasis upon improvement in
existing international approaches, especially in the work of regional
organizations. Existing literature offers ample discussion of the merits
of these various alternatives,1 2 hence the following is neither an
exhaustive nor an intensive survey of the factors relevant to choice of
policy.
The fundamental difficulty for policy, which each of the above
alternatives is intended to resolve, arises both because the resource is
highly migratory and because the traditional legal framework places
most fishery stocks beyond the control of any single authority. At the
same time it is widely agreed that in order to attain maximum use of
the resource, especially under projected conditions of greater intensity
in exploitation throughout the global sea, there is a definite need to
establish a system by which effective regulations can be prescribed for
maintaining the yield of the species exploited. In addition there is little
disagreement about the desirability, assuming it were practical to
achieve and did not displace more valued goals, of further limiting
effort at exploitation so that the economic return therefrom could be
maximized or, at least, improved. Under present conditions there is, in
12 JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES (1965); ODA, INTER-
NATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES (1963); CHAPMAN, FISHERY RESOURCES
IN OFFSHORE WATERS; Alexander, ed., THE LAW OF THE SEA 87 (1967); CHRISTY,
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SEA'S WEALTH IN FISHERIES, id. at 106.
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the absence of agreement, no means by which either of the goals can be
achieved.
Since no one owns high seas fishery resources in the critical sense
of being able to relate the effects of today's fishing activity on the
availability and size of fish that is to be taken in later periods, there is
an inherent tendency to use too much capital and labor in any
operation involving the exploitation of valuable marine resources. In
short, effort will always be pushed to the point where total cost of the
operation and total revenues received are approximately equal (includ-
ing in total cost a reasonable rate of return to capital). Any increase in
the price of the end products or decrease in costs of production will
induce more fishing effort even after the point has been reached where
further effort produces no increase in output and may actually reduce
the catch. 13
From the physical perspective of population magnitude, the present
system permits effort to be increased beyond the point of the
maximum sustainable yield, i.e., until the stock, or stocks are
overfished. As will be indicated below, this description of the legal
structure is rough and requires to be modified to take into account
modifications through agreement. But the basic proposition of freedom
of exploitation holds good, as long as states refrain from agreeing
otherwise.
In terms of the basic objectives specified above, the establishment
of larger and larger areas of exclusive coastal control has little to
commend itself except possibly in a very few exceptional situations
of limited general significance. Whether these larger areas consist of
extensions in terms of 50 miles, of the geological conception of the
shelf, or of the complete division of the oceans among "coastal states,"
the impact is likely to be undesirable for general community goals.
Productivity would very probably decrease, when the crying demand is
for increase, because the coastal state concerned could not itself engage
in full exploitation of the large exclusive area and would be unlikely to
permit access to foreign fishermen except under unrealistic, perhaps
highly onerous, conditions. The efficiency of existing distant water
fishing fleets would almost certainly suffer from the complicated admin-
istrative difficulties and outright prohibitions of access which could be
expected to attend any such system.
Rational management, in terms even of limits on effort to protect
13 Crutchfield, Zones of National Interest: Convention on Fishing and Living Resources
of the Htigh Seas 5, Paper presented at the American Bar Association National Institute on
Marine Resources, June 1967.
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yields, would be virtually impossible to implement for a number of
reasons. The migratory character of the major fishery stocks would in
rnost instances preclude management based on the authority of any
single state (which means that the present difficulty in this respect
would be unresolved) and even the conduct of the scientific research
basic to management decisions would likely become more difficult if
not impossible to undertake. Such cooperation as has already been
achieved in this respect might well suffer a serious setback and the
fruits of decades of labor and perseverance be dissipated. For indication
of the problems posed by migrating fish, the following description by
Dr. W. M. Chapman is enlightening:
The sardine, anchovy, saury, hake, bluefin, and albacore off the
coast of Mexico and California typify the complexity that occurs off
most coasts. Most of the spawning of sardine and anchovy in this region
takes place well to sea offshore both countries, and the fish are
available there for fishing although most of the actual fishing to date is
done reasonably close to shore. Presumably the anchovy do not make
very long migrations, but the sardine may. The hake spawn in this area
also, but apparently move north to feed and grow along the coast up as
far as British Columbia. Although generally coastal and demersal, they
do not always stay close to the bottom, and may often school at or
near the surface. Also they can be readily caught off shore more than
twelve miles. The jack mackerel form a large population, which is fished
on mostly near the coast, but the spawning area extends at least 1,000
miles off the coast, and the fish can be caught out there if large adults
are wanted. The saury are found all over the northern part of the North
Pacific, and we know nothing of their population structure. It appears
to be continuous across the ocean. The albacore spawn thousands of
miles from Mexico and California in the west central Pacific, and after
coming over to where we can fish them off our coast, go back over to
Japan where they can be fished there. The bluefin tuna are commonly
caught in the territorial sea of Mexico and California but do not spawn
in the eastern Pacific at all. They spawn south of Japan and north of
the Philippines, and individuals tagged off Mexico are captured the
other side of Japan. Fur seals feed off California and sometimes as far
south as northern Mexico. Their nearest breeding ground is the Pribilof
Islands in the Bering Sea. Gray whales pass through the territorial sea of
southern California proceeding to their calving grounds in the internal
waters of the lagoons of northern Mexico; and, having fulfilled this
biological purpose, migrate back across the Pacific to the feeding
grounds off Kamchatka and the western Bering Sea. 4
14 CHAPMAN, supra note 97, at 96-7.
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Improvement in the economic returns of a fishery could not be
expected from such a regime. It is notorious that progress in this
respect is almost completely non-existent even now in fisheries wholly
under national control. With more relevance, the division of the ocean
even into "national lakes," and certainly anything less, would still fail
to comprehend all the fishing effort expended on a particular stock or
stocks and it would still be necessary to seek resolution of this
difficulty by international agreement.
It deserves stress that these defects attend all recommended
expansions of exclusive fishery limits. In particular the recent spate of
extensions to twelve miles, a good many of which seek to protect the
relatively inefficient inshore fisherman, is widely acknowledged to
contribute little to acquiring necessary control over fisheries.' s And
even if further extensions could somehow secure preponderant control
the disadvantages in terms of hindering production and increasing costs
would probably far outweigh any exclusive, or even community-wide,
advantages that might accrue.
A good bit of the rhetoric, though certainly not all in view of the
appeals of American fishermen, in support of extended exclusive fishing
zones emphasizes, and exaggerates, the alleged benefits to developing
states in terms of meeting the protein needs of expanding populations.
Two major points should be recalled in this connection that are
pertinent to assessing the genuine, rather than the spurious, interests of
this group of states. Dr. Hiroshi Kasahara has observed that "lack of
rigid institutional arrangements due to the common property nature of
fishery resources, in contrast to the existence of long-established tenure
systems in agriculture, is one of the two obvious factors contributing to
the expansion of fisheries in developing countries ....1 6 It is at least
open to serious doubt whether this advantageous situation could be
maintained for the benefit of these states if the ocean were to be
compartmentalized by the establishment of enormous, but still
numerous, regions to which national laws and administrative structures
were to apply. The obstructions to fisheries expansion by developiig
states which would flow from such an arrangement need hardly be
15 The hearings in the United States Congress on legislation to adopt a 12-mile exclusive
fishing zone are replete with such acknowledgments. See Hearings on S. 2218 before the
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
16 Kasahara, Food Production from the Ocean 36, in 1 First Conference on Law,
Organization and Security in the Use of the Ocean (1967).
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imagined. This factor acquires, incidentally, even more serious import
in view of character of the expanded fishing industries concerned. Dr.
W. M. Chapman notes:
As these developing countries develop coastal fisheries, they trend
almost at once into becoming longer and longer range fishermen as well,
fishing off the coasts of other countries as part of their necessary
fishery economics just about as naturally and necessarily as the fish
migrate for biological necessity. Examples are provided by Mexico,
Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Guayana, Cuba, Senegal, Ivory Coast,
Ghana, Pakistan and Thailand. 1"
The losses to such states from interference with the distant fleets could
outweigh the gains, if any, derived from the protection of their own
near-shore fishermen. If this experience is generalized, and the
implications generally understood, it raises interesting conjectures
about the positions the developing states might take in determination
of community policy toward further expansion of exclusive fishing
areas.
In sum the community policies identified above would not be
served, and probably would be harmed, by seeking to resolve
international fisheries problems by means of large extensions of
national jurisdiction.
No suggestion is intended by the above rather categorical
assertions that any great gain would accrue to the community from
seeking to declare unlawful, or otherwise remove, those rather limited
claims to exclusive fishing zones out to twelve miles. Although the
zones contribute nothing of consequence to resolving any of the real
difficulties posed by fishery management, and may not accomplish
much for the welfare of the particular states concerned, they do exist,
are now very widely accepted, and are likely to continue to enjoy
acceptance. However, it is important that these arbitrary, in terms of
any valid inclusive or exclusive interests, boundaries should be extended
no further. It is better by far to refrain from contributing further to
irrationality and to get on with the problem of seeking to increase
effective use of these resources for a world which is in desperate need
of protein, including that available from ocean fisheries. The disruption
and conflict generated by seeking to reverse the moderate claims
already made also would inhibit genuine resolution of problems.
At the other end of the spectrum in recommendations are those
17 Chapman, supra note 97, at 92.
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urging the establishment of a single global authority, probably as an
agency of the United Nations, to manage all the fisheries of the world
ocean beyond the confines of limited exclusive fishing zones.' 8 These
proposals are frequently accompanied also by the suggestion that the
management goal of such an authority should be that of realizing the
maximum net economic yield from the fisheries." 9 Although the major
purpose underlying these suggestions is that of providing for suitable
management of living resources, a subsidiary objective is often
mentioned in an accompanying proposal that the income generated by
such a scheme should accrue to the United Nations.2 0
There is a good deal of reason to sympathize with the international
agency approach to fishery problems, primarily because it directly meets
the difficulty posed by the migratory nature of marine fish. An
international organization would comprehend the great bulk of the
world's ocean fisheries, at least so long as no further enlargement occurs
in exclusive zones. The proposed goal of such a management scheme,
that of realizing the maximum net economic yield of fisheries also has
very considerable appeal, especially in view of some demonstrations
that, at least in the catching part of the fish business, reduction of
effort could increase the net economic yield significantly in some
specific situations.2 1 Adoption of the global agency approach might be
considered to have the additional advantage of deterring states from
seeking to extend the fishery limits further into the sea.
Unfortunately the attraction of these various reasons for favorable
appraisal of this international system diminishes rather drastically in
18 The principal advocate of this approach in the United States is the Commission to
Study the Organization of Peace. See the 17th Report, New Dimensions for the United Nations
39 (1966).
19 Id. at 38.
20 Id. at 38-9.
21 The Report of the Second Session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries in 1967, for
instance, observes:
... it was the common conclusion, after a study of three
different stocks of demersal fish which are heavily fished in the
North Atlantic area, that a substantial cut in mortality would lead
after a transitional period of from four to six years, to the same or a
larger catch being caught by a reduced (by say 20 percent) fishing
effort."
FAO Report of the Second Session of the Committee on Fisheries, Rome 1967, 24-29 April
1967. FAO Fish. Rep. No. 46, p. 2. Halibut, salmon, whales, cod and haddock are specific
examples of neglect of the costs involved in a fishery. See also Chapman, Problems of the North
Pacific and Atlantic Fisheries 7 (Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting, Fisheries Council of
Canada, Montreal, May 10, 1967).
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light of a number of pragmatic considerations which suggest strongly
that such a universalist approach would be counter-productive.
An initial, fundamental, consideration is that knowledge of marine
resources, on a global basis, is woefully inadequate. Estimates of total
productivity from the ocean vary enormously, yet if the lower ranges in
these estimates were accurate, the problem of overfishing (in the
biological sense) would loom before us rather quickly.2 2 But it is not
so much total productivity of which we need greater knowledge and
understanding. Rather the greater need exists concerning population
dynamics in particular situations. On this score there can be no serious
doubt that the levels of expenditures now being made for this purpose
are completely inadequate.' 3 The importance of this is that such
expenditures are, with very few exceptions, made by individual states
for their own research efforts and staff.2 4 It also is now readily
apparent that states have been unwilling to finance research by newly
established regional agencies,2 probably because this is regarded as
diverting funds from national agencies. It seems wholly unrealistic to
consider that states will be inclined to support a global fisheries agency
with the kind of funds that would be required to see that the necessary
knowledge of this resource would be generated by such an agency.
While there may be prospects for improvement in this regard in local
situations, the blunderbus world-wide agency approach would face
enormous obstacles in attracting support and, in the meantime, would
be confronted with a gigantic regulatory problem for which it neither
had the basic scientific knowledge required not any reasonably likely
prospect of gaining that knowledge.
Objection to the proposed global agency is also founded upon
reservations about the usefulness of the goal of maximum net economic
yield which is often suggested as the objective such an agency should
seek in managing world fisheries. A prime difficulty in this respect is
that the objectives of the many fishing states around the world are so
varied. Dr. Chapman summarized this situation concisely:
22 CHAPMAN, ON THE MANAGEMENT OF OCEAN FISHERIES, in Proceedings of
the 5th Meeting of the (California) Governor's Advisory Commission on Ocean Resources 77,
83(1966).
23 Id. at 80.
2 4 CHAPMAN, supra note 107, at 80; Carroz & Roche, The Proposed International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 673, 696 (1967).
25 A brief account of international organization effort is in Burke, Aspects of Internal
Decision-making Processes in Intergovernmental Fishery Commissions, 43 WASH. L. REV. 115,
154-69 (1967).
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It appears to be a wide-spread goal of nations to optimize their
gross physical yield of food from the ocean. This may be for the
purpose of obtaining foreign exchange, of obtaining needed animal
protein to feed its own population, of protecting its sources of foreign
exchange by limiting its imports, to increase the nation's gross
economic yield, to accumulate capital, to give useful employment to its
people, or to obtain some particular type of fish because of the nation's
particular demands. These objectives are not all compatible. Examples
can be given for each of these objectives. Objectives of nations in this
respect change with changing times and circumstances, and sometimes
rather rapidly. 26
Although conceivably the complexities involved in reconciling diverse
objectives under the umbrella of a single "best," or at least "better," yield
might be resolved on the more selective basis of a particular fishery or
area, there seems ample reason to doubt that such a task can be
discharged on an all-embracing, global basis.
Other problems with the proposed goal can also be cited. First,
assuming maximum economic yield were somehow acceptable to a
sufficient number of states, it would be an enormously complex task to
provide for regulations that would approach the end sought. There is
every reason to doubt that it is at all feasible to undertake this task now
for general application, as some propose. Many fisheries which would
be subjected to the proposed system are exploited by a number of
states whose economic systems and structure are quite diverse and offer
few common denominators for use in constructing a specified economic
yield which could be called the maximum for each state.2 7 Apart from
this there is also the consideration that in many fisheries multiple
species are utilized which are differently prized by the various
exploiting states. The task of regulating such fisheries in order to obtain
the maximum sustained yield fror the various species is complicated in
itself, but to go beyond that to seek economic ends adds much greater
complications.2
Recently, criticism of the economic yield criterion has called
attention to the fact that proponents of it usually are speaking only of
the fish-catching end of the fishing industry and do not take into
account that the entire enterprise extends from catching to processing
26 CHAPMAN, supra note 107, at 85.
27 See Kasahara, supra note 101, at 27-31 and the discussion at pp. A2-A38;
CHAPMAN, supra note 97, at 94.
28 Dr. Chapman reviews and illustrates this and comparable problems, in Chapman,
supra note 107, at 92-3,
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to distribution to the ultimate consumer. Dr. Chapman observes:
A fishery must be considered, from the economic viewpoint, in
the context of the entire range from the ocean to the consumer of the
product. The catching phase is only one part of the business, and profit
(or net economic yield) from it is not always the controlling aspect of
the fishery's economics. If a fishery is to be viable economically the
entire chain from ocean to consumer requires to earn a profit on capital
and labor involved (assets employed) equal to what the same capital
and labor employed in another business will yield or the capital and
labor will go into the other business. It is quite possible that the fishing
link in this chain can be run at a net loss and the whole enterprise be
economically viable if the profit from another link in the chain is
adequate to keep up the profit level of the total. There are a great many
variables in this equation that differ with the different fisheries. Only a
few can be touched upon here, briefly, as examples.2 9
The notion that the global agency approach would produce
income is criticized on a number of grounds, ranging from grave doubt
that any would be produced to reservations about providing an
independent income for the UN as it is presently constituted. The very
size and nature of the administrative and regulatory structure of the
international agency could mean that costs of operation exceed the
income generated by extracting economic rent from fisheries. To te
extent income is produced because fisheries are operated to achieve
their maximum economic yield, it is also pertinent to note the estimate
that probably more than half of world fisheries are now being
conducted at levels below that which marks the maximum net
economic return.' 0 Until the level of effort reaches that which
corresponds to the maximum net economic yield there is no need to
subject the fishery to regulation, hence no opportunity to realize
income.
The issue of an independent income for the UN is not really
relevant in a discussion of ocean problems. Suffice to note that such
income would undoubtedly have to be restricted in terms of the
purposes sought in using it, at least so long as disposition would be
subject to action by the General Assembly.
The third policy alternative, improving the existing regulatory
system for international fisheries, appears to offer more hope for the
foreseeable future than the two methods just discussed. Perhaps it is
29 Id. at 88; 1 First Conference on Law, Organization and Security in the Use of the
Ocean supra note 101, at pp. A34-A38.
30 CHAPMAN, supra note 107, at 94.
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more accurate to phrase it that this alternative seems to be less
unsatisfactory than the others, for hardly anyone expresses much
enthusiasm for the present method of management. Essentially what is
called for by this policy alternative is both improvement in the regional
institutions which are the means by which states now seek to agree on
conservation policies and prescriptions and the creation of such new
bodies as are required to embrace important fisheries which might need
regulation in the future. The belief underlying this policy is that it is
wiser to build upon existing institutions and that the regional approach
offers more hope of adequate surveillance of developing problems and
of the necessary selectivity in attempts to resolve such problems.
Pursuit of this avenue is further recommended because of the trend
now beginning to develop toward efforts at improving existing
institutions. Even assuming these are not wholly satisfactory
arrangements, it seems wiser to utilize their experience and expertise
than to attempt to establish a single gargantuan organization that would
seek management of all fisheries on a global basis.
An important part of the approach at improving and revising
existing institutional mechanisms should be that of seeking to alter the
objectives of management to take greater explicit account of the
economic factors relevant to management. The critical comments
already made regarding maximum economic yield called attention to
the shortcomings of the proposal to adopt this goal for application by a
global agency regulating all the fisheries of the world; such criticisms
have much less cogency in more selective context. In any event certain
aspects of the continuing dialogue about physical and economic goals
are worthy of mention as a final observation about policies.
First, there appears to be a failure in communication among those
involved. Proponents of maximum economic yield in fisheries regula-
tion often begin by conceding that economic factors are but one
element that should be taken into account in choice of conservation
policy, but just as often they proceed to elaborate their position as if
such criteria were the only ones relevant. Perhaps it is not, therefore,
surprising that opposition takes the form of admitting that economic
factors are a consideration important for decision but then devotes the
greatest part of the rebuttal to arguments against employment of
economic factors as the sole criterion for decisions. One of the
difficulties that may partially account for this rather sterile debate is
the dearth of concrete studies into the economic aspects of fisheries. In
terms of empirical investigations there appears to be little evidence
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upon which to base normative guides for conservation policy or guides
to practical negotiations about such policy.
Secondly the point is usefully made by Professor Crutchfield that
the suggestion is not that maximum net economic yield can be
employed as an absolute, but that when this consideration is faced
explicitly states may be able to make judgments that permit such
degree of approximation as is feasible and negotiable at the moment.
The notion is that some improvement in economic yield might be
attained as a practical result of regulation if it is consciously sought
along with other alternatives. Professor Crutchfield asserts that the gap
is so great between the inefficiency engendered by the present lack of
management and the gains from introducing direct controls on fishing
effort that there is a great deal of room for maneuver in seeking
agreement by states for improvement. Even if the optimum cannot be
attained, considerable progress is possible. Similar considerations
suggest the opportunity of reaching agreements upon one or another
level of yield that is acceptable to the states concerned in a fishery even
if it is not the "optimum" or "best" with respect to any of them.
Thirdly, observation has been made that the criterion of maximum
net economic return can be employed not as a goal but as a measuring
stick for determining the costs of various alternative goals of the
regulatory process.3 2 Assuming that some choice must be made
between or among various goals or combinations thereof, consideration
of economic costs attached to them might make a substantial
contribution to defensible or more rational choices.
Trend In Decision
The principal decisions of interest here are those about the
lawfulness of establishing exclusive fishing areas, both through the
enlargement of the territorial sea and through the contiguous fishing
zone concept, and about the management of fisheries beyond exclusive
areas in the high seas.
There is no need to recall in any detail the various proposals for
the territorial sea and exclusive fishing zone reviewed, but not accepted,
at the Geneva Conferences of 1958 and 1960. Although neither
conference succeeded in adopting provisions on these matters, there
31 CRUTCHFIELD, supra note 98, at 6.
32 1 First Conference on Law, Organization and Security in the Use of the Ocean, supra
note 101, at A21-A22.
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was one, at least singularly important consensus clearly revealed at that
time. Despite lack of sufficiently widespread agreement on a width for
the territorial sea or on details about an adjacent fishing zone, there did
appear to be very wide agreement that claims exceeding twelve miles
for either purpose were not lawful. Accordingly there need be no
hesitation in stating that the various 200 mile claims advanced by some
South American states do not accord with customary international law.
Since the last Geneva conference, we noted above, numerous
states have unilaterally proclaimed extensions in the territorial sea and
creation of new exclusive fishing zones. 3  Since such unilateral
pronouncements are an accepted means for creating international law,
the question is whether a pattern of any kind has emerged, or a trend
initiated, indicating the development, or evolution, of a generally
accepted width for the territorial sea and contiguous fishing zone.
With respect to the territorial sea it appears no longer to be
possible to contend, with reasonable justification, that international law
does not permit a breadth wider than three miles. Even if state practice
has not coalesced, in terms of the views of a preponderant number of
states, around a single width beyond three miles, the evidence is quite
clear that a very substantial majority of states do not accept restriction
to a three mile territorial sea. Insofar as fishery resources are concerned,
it does not make much difference what width between three and twelve
miles is regarded as acceptable under international law. The reason for
this is in the accompanying development of a consensus about the
permissibility of an exclusive fishing zone of twelve miles. On this, state
practice seems clearly to indicate that such a zone is in accord with
customary law. The result is that acquisition of exclusive rights to
fishery resources is permissible up to a distance of 12 miles from the
base line for delimiting the territorial sea. Contentions that a
twelve-mile territorial sea is not in accord with international law must
rest on considerations relevant to other issues, hence this controversial
matter is not further examined herein.
Decisions about authority over exploitation of fishery resources
beyond the exclusive fishing area are still dominated by the overriding
general principle that states are entitled to free access to such resources
unless they have explicitly agreed otherwise. Freedom of fishing is
33 It appears that more states have changed one or the other of these limits than have
chosen to retain their limits. To these states must be added the states created since 1958, of
whom only a handful have claimed a territorial sea of 3 miles or neglected to establish a wider
exclusive fishing zone.
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enshrined as one of the four enumerated principles embraced by the
concept of freedom of the seas in Article 1 of the Convention on the
High Seas. Similarly, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of
the Living Resources of the High Seas in Article I affirms the rights of
the nationals of all states to engage in fishing on the high seas subject to
obligations accepted by agreement.
It is not possible within the short compass of the present
discussion to examine the many details of the agreements states have
concluded for regulating their fishing activity on the high seas. The
following observations concern the general process of decision on this
matter and, more specifically, the participants in fishery agreements,
the objectives sought, and the authority conferred on intergovern-
mental agencies.3 4
In overall perspective of the decision process, it is important
initially to note that while states have established a number of advisory
groups, usually hi relationship with FAO, and some intergovernmental
commissions with limited authority, the gap continues to widen
between the intensity of fishing and the potential occurrence of
regulatory problems, on the one hand, and the institutional means for
coping with such problems, on the other. With modest exception,
virtually all consequential international agreements, which provide for
substantive action as distinguished from mere advice, involve a limited
number of the developed states exploiting relatively high value species
in the northern hemisphere where, until recently, the major fisheries
were all located. Yet rapid developments in fisheries, and the potential
for conflict over limitations on yield and effort, are occurring in many
places throughout the ocean and many of the developing states are
heavily engaged in such developments and, hence, in potential conflicts.
There is very serious question whether present procedures, or present
scientific capabilities, are adequate either to identify emerging problems
calling for regulation or to adopt prescriptions suitably fashioned for
dealing with the problems.
Two recent approaches are noteworthy as efforts to establish a
decision process more suitable than that historically employed which
features, primarily, the conclusion of ad hoc agreements among states.
34 The literature cited by Carroz & Roche, supra note 109, provides guidance to the
many details of decision in this area. See also Burke, supra note 110. Special reference should
be made to the valuable work now underway in FAO in examining the various international
institutions engaged in, or related to, fishery management.
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In an attempt to modify, but not to discard wholly, the slow and
cautious route of securing explicit agreement, the Geneva Conference
of 1958 concluded a Conservation Convention which provided for
special authority in coastal states to initiate conservation measures
unilaterally in the absence of agreement by the states affected. 3 1 Even
in this instance agreement must first be sought by the state seeking to
initiate conservation measures, but failure does not preclude the
adoption of regulations and, under certain conditions, their implemen-
tation. Protection of the interests of other states is sought by providing
both a set of criteria for determining the permissibility of the measures
projected and, of the greatest importance, a compulsory method for
making the determination. As commendable as this new procedure
appears to be, in terms of procedure rather than of substantive policy,
the unhappy fact is that the Convention has attracted embarrassingly
little support among states and at this stage, ten years after its initial
adoption, has played no discernible part in facilitating decisions about
instituting conservation measures. Furthermore, although the Conven-
tion has not been invoked as yet, there is reason to suspect that some
states, or fishery groups therein, may hope to employ the Convention
for the purpose of assuring coastal fishermen special exclusive, or
preferential, rights to fisheries rather than only for imposing a limit on
exploitation.
The second and probably more significant set of activities seeks to
work within the present decision process but would attempt to improve
its workings by highly conscious, deliberate, and coordinated surveil-
lance of the world fishing scene in order both to apprehend problems in
timely fashion and to make improvements in existing institutional
structures for fishery regulation. Again without making a detailed
survey of events, the above appears to be an accurate description of
certain primary functions of the newly created Committee on Fisheries
established within the FAO structure. 3 6 Prime assistance in the
accomplishment of these ends is also to be expected from the Advisory
Committee on Marine Resources Research, and its Working Parties,
which provide advice to FAO and to the Intergovernmental Ocean-
35 For examination of this Convention see McDOUGAL & BURKE, THE PUBLIC
ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962); JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
FISHERIES (1965); Oda, supra note 97; GARCIA-AMADOR, THE EXPLOITATION AND
CONSERVATION OF THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA (2d ed. 1959); CRUTCHFIELD, supra
note 98; Burke, Some Comments on the 1958 Conventions, in 1959 Proceedings of the Am.
Soc, Int IL. 197, 204-06.
36 An account of the evolution of FAO activities is in Chapman, supra note 106.
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ographic Commission in UNESCO. The major importance of this
development within FAO, it seems is in provision for performance of
two vital decision functions: (1) the gathering of intelligence about
activities that might occasion need for international regulation or, at
least, cooperation, and (2) the appraisal of presently operating
institutions to determine their effectiveness and to make recommen-
dations of actions required to remedy deficiencies. 37 Since the
Committee on Fisheries is composed of senior fishery officials of many
fishing states (some not in FAO), and ACMRR of widely known and
respected experts, the essential conditions for fulfillment of these tasks
would appear to be met. It is true, of course, that these FAO activities
do not envisage any dramatic change in individual state authority over
the oceans, but they nonetheless could have dramatic impact on the
decision process by reason of the critical nature of the functions
performed. Provision of timely and pertinent information does not
alone assure that action will be taken, but it is, at least, unlikely that
any remedial or advance action would be taken at all unless such
information can be made available.
Turning to more specific aspects of the decision process, it is
evident that participation in fishery regulation on an international level
is, quite understandably, pragmatic in nature, as states seek to deal with
emerging, or suspected, or recognized problems of a particular region or
stock. Participation in agreements is usually, but not always, de-
termined by the interest a state possesses in the region or species as
identified by the fishing activity of its nationals. Since conditions and
interests change over time, sometimes rapidly, agreements need to be,
but are not always, designed to permit relatively easy accession by new
participants. At the same time recent commentary points out that
states party to an agreement seeking common objectives should have a
sufficient commonality of interest to support the joint endeavor. 38
Fortunately, political cleavages, representing conflicting interests of
various extraneous types, do not appear yet to have been a deterrent to
participation in conservation programs.
A major difficulty, already being experienced and likely to get
37 See the reports of the first two sessions of the Committee. FAO Fish Rep. No. 33
and No. 46. See also the article by Roy Jackson, Assistant Director General (Fisheries) of FAO,
World Fisheries in 1966 and 1967, 6 Fishing News International No. 7, p. 20, July, 1967.
38 Report of the Advisory Committee on Marine Resources Research Working Party on
FAO Regional Fisheries Councils and Commissions 11-13 (Doc. No. ACMRR: 4/67/WP. 27)
(14 January 1967).
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worse, comes from the rapid increase in fishing intensity, especially in
relation to the amount of research into the impact of that activity on
the species exploited. The question is: when is it necessary to take
concerted action to avoid excessive effort and reduction of yield?
Because of the nature of the resource and the complexity of developing
reliable information about it, appropriate answers to this question
demand international cooperation as well as coordination of individual
efforts. Fortunately, as already noted, existing international institutions
are available for this task and efforts are already underway to deal with
this problem
At the same time, however, it would be unrealistic to overlook
that states are by no means displaying any great anxiety about
becoming party to the 1958 Conservation Convention which seeks to
provide for a means of fishery regulation that does not necessarily
depend upon the specific agreement of affected states. Fishing states
must, however, accept the basic agreement in substantial numbers
before it can be expected to have any useful role in resolving the
problems of providing acceptable conservation regulations for high seas
fisheries. Although this agreement is in effect now, slightly more than
22 states having ratified it, very few of these states engage in
consequential fishing activity.3 9 Assuming the Conservation Con-
vention provides a useful framework and procedure for resolving fishery
conservation problems, and that adequate substantive policies are
developed, it still cannot be of consequential help if major fishing states
ignore it or if the number of accepting states does not grow
substantially. It deserves reiteration that the Conservation Convention
does not reflect customary law with respect to the authority of coastal
states, hence it cannot be invoked by one of the latter against a
non-party distant water state.
The extent of participation in this agreement, and other indicators
mentioned below, probably accurately reflect the degree of disinterest
and inertia among states regarding the ocean fishery difficulties that
loom on the horizon. Within the United States, the subject has recently
attracted far wider interest than ever before but so far as high level.
policy makers are concerned there is reason to doubt that there is either
39 Of the important fishing states only the U.S., the U.K., Portugal and South Africa
and parties. The rest of the parties, with some exceptions, catch only minor amounts of fish
and are scattered around the globe.
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adequate grasp of the problems involved or the inclination to provide
the means necessary to deal with them in time. 40
Decisions about the objectives of conservation regimes display a
rather notable degree of uniformity on the international level. Almost
all of the individual agreements establishing intergovernmental com-
missions, as well as the 1958 Conservation Convention, project the goal
of maximum sustainable yield as the end to which regulations are to be
directed. "' Close observers, and participants, in the process of decision
on these matters are quite positive in their assertion that the selection
of this goal reflects neither parochial bias of scientists toward physical
yields as the desirable goal nor a lack of concern over broader social
goals. 42 Rather, it is explained, there are insuperable difficulties in
accommodating all the various and diverse social objectives sought by
states in fishery exploitation, except for the general consensus that it is
in the common interest to take no more than the maximum the
resource will yield on a sustainable basis. Concurrence on this goal both
operates to maintain the stock(s) at the highest equilibrium level and
facilitates the determination by each individual state of the goal it most
prizes within that limit. Achievement of more refined goals is then to
be left to negotiation between the particular states concerned.
At the same time, however, there is an easily discernible awareness
in international decision-makers of the need for, and desirability of,
taking account of economic considerations in selection of alternative
prescriptions. In some degree it seems highly probable that these factors
already influence international conservation decisions, but there ap-
pears to be a growing demand for taking more explicit account of
them. A recent FAO staff report offers substantial indication of an
attitude that even if present previously, is now more evident:
Recently, renewed attention has been drawn to the need for
detailed evaluation of the economic consequences of over-fishing.
Congestion on some of the most popular high seas fishing grounds
has, in some instances, led to international friction. Furthermore,
40 The first report of the new National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering
Development plans special emphasis upon providing a solution to the world food problem. The
niggardly sums apparently to be devoted to this "solution," in relation to the magnitude of the
difficulties involved, suggests that there is less to this emphasis that meets the eye.
41 The Convention employs the term "optimum sustainable yield" but this is generally
understood as referring to the maximum.
42 Kasahara, supra note 101, at 27; discusssion, id. at A32-A38; Chapman, supra note
107, at 86-7.
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governments and industry are increasingly concerned over the
economic waste involved in the employment of more capital and
labor than is necessary to produce a given output. The early
economic studies demonstrated that an unregulated fishery would
not automatically lead to an economic optimum, and that a
fishery giving the maximum sustainable yield in weight from a
fish stock would in general not give the maximum net profit.
The introduction of economic data and analysis will not
however provide administrators with ready-made solutions to the
complicated problems affecting management decisions. As the
biologists can sometimes forecast the effects of alternative
methods of regulation on the physical yield of a fishery, the
economist may be able to "cost" these methods and thus indicate
a preferred line of action from the standpoint of "economic
efficiency," in terms of input use of market preference. There
may be reasons for making a choice to some degree different
because of considerations of political or social acceptability or
administrative feasibility. Political factors enter the picture where
regulatory action has pronounced "distribution effects," i.e.
disrupts the existing equilibrium between groups interested in the
fishery. Distribution problems arise in connection with the
division of catch and employment opportunities among nations
participating in a regulated fishery and, within a nation, the
division of such opportunities among different fleets and types of
gear. Special problems arise in fisheries in which two or more
species are fished simultaneously, in particular if the various
groups participating in such a fishery have different preferences
for the species caught, because generally the individual species
will react differently to a particular regulation method. However,
it is possible to determine who, under particular methods of
regulation, is a "gainer" and who is a "loser." Clearly those
regulations which promise to result in economic gains for all
participants will be preferred to those which are bound to hurt all
or some. Clearly also, agreement can be more easily obtained with
regard to regulatory changes that disturb an existing equilibrium
less than others. To the extent that it can shed some light on
these aspects, economic analysis can make some contribution also
toward the solution of the "distribution" question, although the
final choice between possible alternatives will be made on the
basis of broader policy considerations.
Even where collection of economic information is, however,
intended to do no more than to study "efficiency" effects, it will
serve useful purposes in the administration of regulatory pro-
grams, both in forecasting probable effects, and for taking timely
corrective action.
43 FAO, Committee on Fisheries, Doc. No. COFI/10/66.
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The Committee on Fisheries itself commented in its First Report:
The Committee stressed the unique characteristics of the common
property fishery resources of the high seas, and endorsed the general
objective of fishing nations to obtain the optimum economic yield from
all fish stocks and resources. While techniques for the biological
assessment of fish stocks were relatively well advanced (although far
from universally applied), the basic concepts of criteria for judging
economic returns were still in a relatively early stage of development.
The Committee therefore placed a more intensive study of the
economic aspects of fishery management high in priority in its future
program44
Despite the existence of numerous fishery commissions it is a
mistake to conclude that member states have surrendered any sub-
stantial autonomy in decision to these groups or that they are endowed
with adequate resources for implementing their objectives. Generally
speaking the formal authority conferred on the intergovernmental
commissions is severely limited and it is a rare instance that they are
sufficiently endowed to adopt prescriptions which become effective
against the wishes of a member. 4s Apart from practice, which may
indicate a greater level of control, the commissions are usually limited
to making recommendations which the members may or may not
choose to implement. Such a pattern hardly provides a basis for
confidence that states will be willing soon to confer upon an
international agency the kind of control required for effective
management of fisheries.
Although centralized research activities, under international con-
trol may not necessarily be most fruitful in all situations, it is still
notable that very few of the fishery commissions and groups are
provided with a staff to carry out this function. This is the more
renarkable in view of the widespread, if not unanimous, view that the
most successful regimes have been those with a staff for carrying out
research independent of national control. A principal reason for this
situation consists of the scarcity of funds for research on a national
level, which accounts for the unwillingness to establish an international
agency with a need for such funds. 46
44 FAO Fish. Rep. No. 33, p. 9 (1966).
45 Carroz & Roche, supra note 109, at 684-93; Burke, supra note 110, at 154-74.
46 Dr. Chapman perhaps pinpoints the source of this antipathy: These three quite
successful commissions [Halibut, Salmon and Tunaj often have been supported by funding by
their member countries on a level more adequate than those governments have funded the
research by their own fishery agencies on internal fishery management problems of comparable
magnitude." Chapman, supra note 106, at 14.
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As far as general financial support for the fishery conservation
commissions is concerned, it is usually observed to be minimal in
relation to the scope and complexity of the problems involved. As
noted, this is not accounted for by any animus toward this form of
cooperation, but seemingly by the fact that all funds for activity in this
field are limited on a national basis. Until the problems involved
become high priority, or higher than presently, there is little reason to
expect change. Within individual states, it is true that officials
immediately responsible are aware of the difficulties, but generally
these officials are not sufficiently high in the government to effect
changes in policy.
Appraisal and Recommendation
Insofar as international decision functions are concerned, the
decisions reviewed offer some basis for optimism that impressive gains
are being made toward keeping abreast of the regulatory difficulties of
marine fisheries. It would be, in any case, premature to offer criticism
of the very recent transformation within FAO which is designed to
attack these difficulties with a greater sense of urgency and importance
than had been attached to them before. Nonetheless it remains to be
seen whether the agencies and groups involved can successfully sustain
their efforts in the face of the inertia or disinterest which appears to
grip important member states at high levels of administration. Although
a considerable range of activities are occurring in the development of
world marine fisheries as a source of protein, it is plain that certain, at
least, developed states do not place a high priority on this matter
however extravagant the promises in the rhetoric employed for public
consumption. And just as food from the sea actually occupies a very
minor part in plans for ocean development, little significance appears to
be attached to the management problems already existing and which
will multiply as exploitation intensifies. In view of the lead time
required for coping with the very costly research effort which must
serve as the principal basis for fishery regulations, there is, over all, little
reason for encouragement to be found in the niggardly support now
made available for this purpose nationally or internationally. The time
for investing in this effort must, because of the nature of the problem,
precede the need for regulation by a long period. In this sense, then,
revisions in international regulatory procedures and practices may be
rather barren signs of hope, however encouraging they are otherwise.
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